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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
LESSONS FROM SALW CONTROL INITIATIVES IN AFRICA \ NELSON ALUSALA
The proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in 
Africa is partly attributable to weak national controls, the porosity of state bor-
ders, and ongoing armed conflict on the continent. To address these problems 
a number of initiatives have been undertaken by states, regional organisa-
tions, and other various implementing agencies with the aim of enhancing 
small arms control. This report examines these initiatives over a ten year period 
(2005–2015) in sixteen countries across the Greater Sahel region and generates 
a set of lessons learned. These lessons cover topics such as project duplication, 
the impact of internal donor restructuring, and the importance of identifying 
the needs and implementing capacities of local partners. While these lessons 
are intended to contribute to the existing body of research on small arms con-
trol, they are also, more importantly, intended to help donors and practitioners 
improve project design and impact. 
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Project design and tools should be tai-
lored to local needs and capacities prior 
to the implementation of projects
While it is important to conduct a thorough 
needs assessment before embarking on a small arms 
control project, it is equally as important to assess 
the capacity of the state to implement a particular 
project. Numerous small arms control initiatives, in-
cluding projects to mark and register arms, have been 
hampered by attempts to begin activities in a setting 
where the necessary infrastructure and legislative 
backing is not in place. Implementation tools should 
therefore be tailored to local capacities, including lo-
cal technological capacities. 
Projects should be protected, where 
possible, from changes in donor priori-
ties and internal donor restructuring
Donor countries and institutions are vulnerable 
to internal changes and conflicts, including turf dis-
putes over whether funding should be dispersed 
through one policy instrument or another. Such inter-
nal conflicts can cause delays in the release of funds 
to recipients. While it is difficult to generalise the im-
pact of delayed donor funding on recipient states, in-
ternal realignments and conflicts on the side of do-
nors must be managed cautiously.
The over-funding and duplication of 
projects should be addressed through 
increased donor co-ordination and na-
tional planning 
In emergency or post-conflict situations many 
donors may react to the same small arms related 
problem in a similar way, perhaps even utilising the 
same local partner. Such situations can result in proj-
ect duplication and can stretch the ability of local 
partners to cope with an influx of resources and proj-
ects. For donors, the need for co-ordination is raised 
consistently in relation to all foreign aid provision 
and is not unique to the issue of small arms control. 
In cases of crisis intervention, co-ordination may not 
This report1 analyses SALW control interven-
tions between 2005 and 2015, in sixteen countries 
across the Greater Sahel. These sixteen countries cov-
er the Sahel, West Africa and Maghreb regions, and 
include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, 
Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tunisia. 
Information on small arms control projects in these 
countries was primarily drawn from a desk-top re-
view and was analysed to generate to the following 
set of lessons learned:
SALW projects should take a regional 
approach for a wider and more effec-
tive impact
A regional approach to the challenge of SALW 
seems to stand a better chance of success than when 
the problem is dealt with at the national level, without 
due consideration for the sub-regional and cross-border 
dynamics of arms proliferation. Regionally-based proj-
ects also hold the potential to enhance information 
sharing, coordination, and co-operation amongst par-
ticipating states. .
Innovative research can establish new 
approaches to arms control
African countries are often unwilling to share 
sensitive information on the manufacture, import, 
and export of weapons and ammunition. Recently 
however, the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network 
(AEFJN, 2010) broke through this barrier, gathering 
and sharing information on the manufacture and ex-
port of SALW across the continent. While research on 
the trade and manufacture of arms in Africa has 
most often been conducted by Western institutions, 
the encouragement and support of Africa-based re-
search institutions, such as the AEFJN, could contrib-
ute to a culture of greater transparency. 
 
1 \  The report benefitted from advice provided by Ms Cheryl Frank (ISS 
Division Head), Ben Coetzee (ISS Senior Researcher), Joanne Richards 
(BICC), Wolf-Christian Paes (BICC), and Nicolas Kasprzyk (ISS Senior 
Research Consultant).
Main findings
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be easy to achieve, yet should nonetheless be priori-
tised. Certain steps can also be taken to improve 
co-ordination, including joint needs assessments 
(conducted at the same time by different implement-
ing agencies), and ongoing communication relating 
to project activities.
Risks should be identified and managed 
early rather than focusing on crisis 
management
A general examination of the landscape of small 
arms control initiatives in the Greater Sahel indicates 
that there are a greater number of emergency inter-
vention projects (those that respond to crisis or con-
flict) than preventive or early intervention efforts. 
Public information should be provided 
by donors and beneficiary govern-
ments throughout the lifespan of a 
project
Small arms control projects typically receive 
greater publicity at the time of their launch than dur-
ing project implementation and closure. While expo-
sure during a project launch may be productive, in 
part because it creates public awareness, similar pub-
lic information should be provided throughout other 
notable phases of a project’s implementation and end. 
Greater transparency in terms of the closure and ac-
tual impact of projects may help to minimize project 
duplication. Furthermore, dissemination of lessons 
learned may help other donors and implementing 
agencies to avoid repeating past mistakes.
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to offer information to donors, implementing agen-
cies and potential programme beneficiaries with the 
expectation of contributing to improved programme 
design in terms of the funding, planning, execution 
and evaluation of programmes.
Commissioned by the Bonn International Centre 
for Conversion (BICC) and conducted by the Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS), this report is part of a 
broader programme of activities being undertaken by 
BICC to strengthen the control of SALW in Africa. It 
consists of two parts: The first part contains the les-
sons drawn from an analysis of projects implement-
ed in the 16 countries studied. These lessons are illus-
trated by selected examples drawn from the 
countries reviewed. This is followed by an overview of 
the conclusions emerging from these lessons. The 
second part of the study is presented as an Annex 
consisting of an additional list of projects, which 
were included in the review of the 16 selected 
countries.
The study had a range of limitations, which are 
discussed in the Methodology section below. 
The proliferation and trafficking of small arms 
and light weapons (SALW) in Africa is partly attribut-
able to weak national controls, the porosity of state 
borders and ongoing armed conflict on the continent. 
These factors continue to pose a challenge to the safe 
storage and use of SALW, and present a significant 
threat to Africa’s security and development. Whether 
lawful or illicit, arms contribute to a wide range of Af-
rica’s existing and emerging security concerns due to 
the risk of diversion in various contexts including 
during armed conflict, violent extremism, organised 
crime, and community and domestic violence. None-
theless, Africa continues to engage in a range of initi-
atives to control the misuse of arms including partic-
ipation in the implementation of international 
agreements such as the United Nations (UN) Pro-
gramme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), among other efforts. The 
success of these initiatives lies ultimately in their 
implementation at the national and sub-regional lev-
els, and this requires significant commitment from 
governments, non-state actors and donors to act co-
operatively to achieve the changes required. 
Given the many and varied efforts made thus far, 
it is critical to assess what lessons may have emerged 
up to now, particularly in relation to programme de-
sign, delivery and results. This is an important exer-
cise given that it can contribute to improved pro-
gramme design in the future and, more specifically, 
to the strengthened impact of donor investments in 
this sector. To this end, this study examines not only 
the original objectives of programmes and their actu-
al outcomes, but also the processes involved in the 
design and implementation of those initiatives. As is 
explained in the methodology section below, this was 
a complex endeavour, with a range of limitations and 
difficulties. 
This study seeks to contribute to the body of 
knowledge on promoting effective programming in 
the field of SALW. This was undertaken through a re-
view of programme interventions in 16 selected Afri-
can countries, over a 10-year period, and by the draw-
ing of lessons and observations (both positive and 
negative) relating to programme design, implemen-
tation and results. The study is specifically designed 
Introduction
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The initial idea was to structure the study in two 
parts. The first part of the study would involve exten-
sive data collection on SALW programmes utilising 
open, web-based sources. This search would relate to 
the 16 countries under review, i.e. Algeria, Burkina 
Faso, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Mali, 
Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Su-
dan, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mauritania and Tunisia, and 
cover the period 2005 to 2015.2 
This review involved gathering and analysing rel-
evant documents in both English and French. This 
review also produced information on several mul-
ti-country and/or sub-regional initiatives, and the 
data from these reports was also analysed. As indicat-
ed, this analysis was used to generate a set of lessons 
learned. It should be noted that the documentary 
sources consulted for this study, which are fully refer-
enced, were taken at face value, and that it was not 
within the scope of this study to verify the reliability 
of the documented information.
It was envisaged that the second step of the re-
search would be to verify the data as well as the set of 
lessons gathered from the desk-top review. This 
would be done by engaging directly with respondents 
in the 16 countries, who were familiar with the proj-
ects identified by the web-based searches in the 16 
countries. This process was meant to generate more 
detailed information on the projects, including views 
on whether the project/s had achieved their objec-
tives, and what lessons may have been learned. This 
was to be done through semi-structured telephone 
interviews. Respondents were to remain anonymous, 
owing to the potential sensitivities of the questions 
to be asked. Respondents were to be selected from a 
pool of names obtained from official sources (e.g. des-
ignated national focal persons) as well as individuals 
(from governments or implementing agencies) 
known to have either participated in or to have co-or-
dinated projects. 
A number of challenges emerged in relation to 
the interview process. While the exercise provided 
some further clarification and verification, due to the 
2 \  The list of countries and the period under review were determined by 
BICC, the commissioning organisation.
broad time period under review, respondents tended 
not to have complete, nor often specific knowledge of 
particular projects. In addition, in a number of cases, 
these discussions raised a number of questions that 
required additional information which could only be 
obtained through further interviews with project do-
nors and/or implementing partners. Undertaking 
these additional interviews was beyond the time 
frame and scope of this study. Due to these factors, 
the interview data was deemed too problematic to in-
clude in the analysis. This occasioned a shift in meth-
odology where the study was adjusted to rely strictly 
on the documented sources obtained through the 
desk-top review described above. The study was con-
ducted under other restrictions and limitations, 
which are noted below: 
   \ Time constraints. The study had to take place 
within a short time-frame (two months from 
start to completion). Within this two-month 
interval, there was a short two-week period to 
generate preliminary, emerging lessons to be 
presented at a workshop in Addis Ababa.
   \ Limited publicly accessible project documentation via 
the Internet: Extensive reviews undertaken by 
researchers (in both English and French) found 
significant weaknesses related to the public 
availability of information posted on the Inter-
net. While the existence of many projects 
could be noted, limited information could be 
accessed about the details of these projects 
throughout their lifespans, including their de-
sign processes, implementation processes and 
ultimate results. While this information may 
have been produced (e.g. for donor reporting 
purposes), it was not comprehensively pub-
lished for several projects. In many cases, infor-
mation was made available about the project 
upon its announcement or launch, but limited 
or no additional (or only very limited) informa-
tion was found (also refer to discussions below 
under Lessons 6 and 7).
   \ Period under review: The project was designed to 
survey SALW initiatives over a 10-year period. 
This is a significant period, and while exten-
sive searches were conducted, it was not 
Methodology
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programmes. Furthermore, this study identifies sev-
eral issues that warrant further investigation in fu-
ture research activities.  
Overall, the findings presented below cannot be 
viewed as conclusive in any way, but rather should be 
viewed as a contribution to the body of available 
knowledge on lessons from SALW programme inter-
ventions. This study should provide food for thought, 
as donors, governments and practitioners plan new 
programmes. Furthermore, this study identifies sev-
eral issues that warrant further investigation in fu-
ture research activities.  
possible to exhaustively and comprehensively 
review all relevant projects for the entire period. 
One important factor relates to the limited 
availability of project documentation noted 
above, and whether project implementers reg-
ularly posted information online in the earlier 
years of this period.
   \ Mapping of the context: It should be noted that 
the scope of this paper did not allow for analy-
sis of the context in each country, and how this 
may have contributed to the selection and de-
sign of projects. For example, significant politi-
cal developments, including forms of conflict, 
have taken place in the 10-year period under 
review in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, 
Egypt, and Tunisia. There is clear evidence in 
some cases that such dynamics influenced do-
nor funding patterns and priorities, as well as 
the priorities of implementing organisations. 
It was not within the scope of this project to 
map this context in relation to each country 
under review.
Generally, the design of this project, and the limi-
tations experienced are in themselves lessons for fu-
ture efforts to extract lessons on SALW programming, 
as well as for SALW programmes themselves. In 
terms of the latter, it is particularly important to note 
the need for programmes to be documented and eval-
uated, and for this information to be made publicly 
available, as far as is possible.
Notwithstanding the tight time frames, this 
study benefited from the discussion of its prelimi-
nary findings at a workshop on SALW held in Addis 
Ababa in September 2015, co-hosted by the African 
Union (AU) and BICC. 
The study is a result of ongoing consultations 
and meetings between BICC and the ISS, before and 
during the period of the study. The final methodology 
was agreed during the course of these consultations.  
Overall, the findings presented below cannot be 
viewed as conclusive in any way, but rather should be 
viewed as a contribution to the body of available 
knowledge on lessons from SALW programme inter-
ventions. This study should provide food for thought, 
as donors, governments and practitioners plan new 
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Limited information is available on a project conducted throughout the 
Sahel region by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Dis-
armament in Africa (UNREC), in co-operation with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). This study, which also takes a re-
gional approach, is titled: “Small arms surveys for Sahel coun-
tries,” 3 and was implemented between December 2014 and May 2015.  
The terms of reference (ToR) for this Baseline Survey as extracted from 
a document outlining requirements for research services in Burkina 
Faso4 indicates that these surveys are national baseline surveys, but 
that the initiative will serve six states in the Sahel region, namely, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. The term, 
“baseline survey” indicates that these studies are a precursor to further 
project interventions; however, limited information is available in this 
regard. The project’s stated objective is to improve the physical security 
and stockpile management (PSSM) abilities of the Sahel states so as 
to reduce the risk of illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition in the 
six countries. According to the terms of the research, 
.... UNREC would conduct an assessment of all existing 
PSSM-related legislation, as well as administrative and 
standard operating procedures, making full use of already 
available assessments and liaising with ongoing regional and 
bilateral projects supporting legislative reforms in SALW, to 
avoid duplication and overlap (European Council, 2014).
Desktop research into the UNREC-UNDP project did not generate fur-
ther information on this project, or on whether the country-level base-
line reports will be made publicly available.
Comment
A few issues of interest emerge from the projects 
noted above. Both projects have taken note of the 
need to strategically approach SALW problems from 
the regional level, rather than limit their focus to the 
national level. Firstly, this approach, if successfully 
implemented, not only serves to benefit a wider 
range of countries, but critically has the potential for 
several other important benefits. These projects may 
be able to consider the regional dynamics of arms 
flows and obtain innumerable advantages through 
the enhancement of co-ordination and co-operation 
3 \ Experts Meeting for the AU–Germany Project on Enhanced SALW Con-
trol and PSSM in the Greater Sahel Region. Power Point Presentation,  
4 September 2015, Addis Ababa.  
4 \ Terms of Reference Consultant Small arms and light weapons expert,  
http://unrec.org/docs/jobs/ToR_SAHEL_BASELINE_SURVEY_Burkina_
Faso.pdf (accessed on 22 September 2015). 
Lesson 1: SALW projects should take a 
regional approach for a wider and 
more effective impact 
A regional approach to the challenge of SALW 
seems to stand a better chance of success than when 
the problem is dealt with at the national level, with-
out due consideration for the sub-regional and 
cross-border dynamics of arms proliferation. Two 
projects that are currently being implemented at the 
regional level help to illustrate this. (It should be not-
ed that both projects are ongoing and that this lesson 
therefore represents a promising approach that 
should be the subject of future research.)
The first of these two projects is currently imple-
mented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), the other is a joint effort between 
the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and 
Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP). 
This Programme is at an advanced stage of implementation, and has 
thus far registered promising outcomes (UNDOC, 2015). Here, the 
UNODC aims to strengthen the Sahel against crime and terrorism. 
The Programme is part of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel 
2013 to 2017, created in response to the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 2056 of 2012. 
The objective is to benefit countries of the Sahel by strengthening 
government capacities and enhancing the accessibility, efficiency and 
accountability of criminal justice systems in order to combat drug traf-
ficking, illicit trafficking (including of arms), organised crime, terror-
ism and corruption. While the Programme was originally designed to 
benefit only member states of the Sahel region (i.e. Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania and Niger), the UNODC identified the advantages 
of an inter-regional approach in implementing the Programme. Its 
current design therefore takes cognisance of the cross-border dynamics 
of small arms proliferation and seeks to address these dynamics by in-
cluding countries within the Sahel region but also within the adjoining 
regions of the Maghreb and West Africa. This includes Algeria, Libya 
and Morocco (from the Maghreb region) as well as wider West Africa 
(such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo). 
By doing so, the UNODC report indicates that the Programme has 
been able to register gains in the area of firearms control, terrorism 
prevention, asset disclosure, anti- corruption, money laundering and 
information exchange.
Box 1  
UNDOC Sahel Programme 
3. Lessons Learned
Box 2  
UNREC and UNDP-led Baseline Surveys on SALW for Sahel 
countries 
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implemented simultaneously by UN agencies. This 
issue also emerges under Lesson 3 and Lesson 5 below. 
Lesson 2: Innovative research has 
established new approaches to arms 
control
While, in principle, all African states can generally 
accept that the control of SALW should be on the 
agenda, one specific aspect remains rare. This relates 
to the willingness of African countries to share de-
tails of the arms and ammunition they manufacture 
between themselves (including to whom such items 
are sold, and in what quantities). Equally rare is the 
disclosure of such weapons-related information to 
non-governmental organisations.
This lesson illustrates an unusual and positive 
effort towards the documenting of legal manufactur-
ing and transfer of arms and ammunition from an 
African country to other African countries. This effort 
was undertaken by the Africa Europe Faith and Jus-
tice Network (AEFJN) and is documented in a research 
report titled “Arms Exports and Transfers: From 
Sub-Saharan Africa to Sub-Saharan Africa” (AEFJN, 
2010). This report denotes success in an area that is 
deemed sensitive due to the perception that arms 
manufacturing is a matter of state secrecy and there-
fore the preserve of state security organs. 
In 2010, the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN) re-
leased a study that provided information on African countries that 
manufacture arms and ammunition. The study notes that while South 
Africa is the leading manufacturer on the continent, other countries 
such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe also manufacture arms, am-
munition or both. The study also documents the intra-continental 
transfer of arms between countries as well as from producing countries 
to non-state actors (ibid.)    
The study provides some unique information. Table 1.1 of this study, 
for example, lists 29 African countries to which South Africa exported 
conventional weapons between 2008 and 2009, including the value of 
the arms exported. In addition, Table 1.5 on pages 5 to 6 of the same 
amongst participating states on a range of arms con-
trol issues. 
Secondly, projects implemented at the regional 
level may also enable countries to share lessons and 
exchange new ideas on similar projects. This can po-
tentially increase capacity-building and strengthen 
the allocation of resources among countries. Thirdly, 
this approach allows other donors who may be sup-
porting similar initiatives at the national level to 
strengthen their efforts through joint efforts. 
The reports produced thus far by UNODC indicate 
that the approach is showing progress. The latest re-
port dated April 2015, states:
... Following UNODC support, Mali, Niger and Senegal 
can now trace illicit small arms in a fast and reliable 
manner, implementing international best practices 
of marking such weapons. Draft firearms legislation 
aligned with international standards is set for adop-
tion in Senegal (UNODC, 2015).
UNODC’s progress reports can also be considered 
a “best practice” in terms of project reporting, which 
was a specific concern referred to in the earlier Meth-
odology section of this report. While the UNODC proj-
ect has a five-year cycle (2013–2017), its design has pro-
vided for planned progress reports that document 
successes and challenges emerging from the imple-
mentation process. This type of reporting enables ear-
ly intervention, where necessary, to correct any ele-
ments of the project that may not be working as 
expected.
The project implemented jointly by UNREC and 
UNDP is similar to the UNODC project in its adoption 
of a regional view. Notwithstanding the planned 
completion date for the initial study set at May 2015, 
neither progress reports, project updates nor the final 
reports have been made available online, making any 
further assessment difficult. 
The preference for regional approaches is also re-
flected in the projects listed in the Annex to this re-
port, and the reasons for this should be the subject of 
further investigation. 
Another interesting question raised by this lesson 
is whether these projects were co-ordinated with 
each other given their common focus on the Sahel 
countries, and the fact that they were both 
Box 3  
AEFJN continental study on the manufacture and export 
of SALW 
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and sales, and serve to mainstream the more regular 
sharing of such information, especially through 
established channels such as the UN Register of Con-
ventional Arms. Such studies, if regularly undertaken, 
could also serve as a peer review mechanism for Afri-
can countries to assess their own continental capaci-
ties in arms manufacturing, and encourage additional 
countries to share information in regard to these 
questions. 
Also of interest in this case was the fact that this 
report was produced by a non-governmental, faith-
based network. Could it be that African countries may 
be more responsive to studies led by faith-based 
organisations? On a related note, an additional open 
question is why such information was availed to 
AEFJN?
At the global level, the approach taken in the 
AEFJN report is not unique. Findings from elsewhere 
demonstrate that it is possible for countries to devel-
op joint mechanisms to deal with concerns regarding 
the disclosure of sensitive information on the manu-
facture and transfer of arms and ammunition. There-
fore, donors and recipient countries should explore 
how lessons drawn from elsewhere could be applied 
in Africa. For example in 1998, the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay,) adopted 
the Southern Cone Presidential Declaration on Com-
bating the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in Fire-
arms, Ammunition and Related Materials, and there-
after established the Firearms Working Group, which 
developed a Joint Registration Mechanism for small 
arms and light weapons, ammunition, explosives and 
other related materials within the MERCOSUR Secu-
rity Information System5. 
5 \  The Joint Registration Mechanism’s Security Information System in-
cludes (i) a register of individuals and legal entities to buy, sell, exch-
ange, import, export and distribute firearms; (ii) a register of ports of 
shipment and importation, including intermediate points; and (iii) 
national registers of individual and institutional firearms owners. The 
parties also agreed to use the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission (CICAD) Model Regulations framework to establish natio-
nal data processing centres to monitor compliance. See, “A Multi-pron-
ged Approach to Transnational Criminal Networks: The Case of Latin 
America and the Caribbean,” http://interamericanos.itam.mx/wor-
king_papers/05JULIA.pdf (accessed on 2 October 2015).
study lists Sub-Saharan African countries with emerging weapons 
manufacturing capacity (ibid.)
 Apart from the UN register to which African countries report (as is 
the case with other member states of the UN system), there is no con-
tinental mechanism to foster intra-continental transparency in arms 
manufacturing and transfers. Noting this deficiency, one might expect 
that donors funding SALW work in Africa would also support the es-
tablishment of a continental register system to build the continent’s 
capacity to feed into the UN register. However, this seems not to be the 
case, as online research reveals. This makes the study by AEFJN one of 
the very few that provides publicly accessible data on this issue. 
The weakness of the AEFJN report, however, is that it does not indicate 
what its main purposes are, and neither does it state who financed the 
research. This information would be useful in informing potential 
donors on how to get involved in reinforcing the process further.
Comment
In Africa, as in many other countries, issues of 
arms manufacturing, their export and import are 
held as the preserve of the state. This study, uniquely, 
broke through this barrier to obtain and publish in-
formation on the manufacture and sale of arms and 
ammunition within Sub-Saharan Africa.
Of the other similar types of studies in existence, 
most tend to source information not from African 
countries directly, but rather from reports that coun-
tries submit to international databases such as the 
UN registers. Reporting to such registers can be irreg-
ular. Such studies are often about arms coming into 
Africa from Western manufacturers, as opposed to 
the intra-African arms trade. Moreover, such studies 
have been predominantly conducted by Western re-
search institutions, with very limited equal collabora-
tion (if any) with Africa-based research institutions. A 
case in point is an annual report by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms 
Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa,  which primarily docu-
ments arms imports to African countries from West-
ern manufacturers. (Wezeman, Wezeman & Sudreau, 
2011). 
If encouraged, reports that incorporate the work 
of / findings of African institutions, by using an ap-
proach similar to that taken by AEFJN, have the po-
tential to enhance transparency relating to the man-
ufacture and transfer of arms within Africa. Such 
reports may also contribute to a culture of greater 
transparency in Africa relating to arms manufacture 
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In 2004, the MERCOSUR countries also adopted a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the manu-
facture and illicit trafficking of firearms. This MoU 
was aimed at tackling illicit cross-border trafficking 
and promoting co-operation among national law en-
forcement authorities. MERCOSUR also conducts 
technical meetings between police and security forces 
on the problem of illicit trafficking in firearms to ex-
change information and share experiences. 6
The approach taken by the AEFJN report is in line 
with the initiatives described above. However, such 
research should be undertaken with regularity, if it is 
to be of value. Donors and recipient governments in 
Africa should explore how to invest in such initia-
tives, especially to complement current reporting sys-
tems such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms. 
Lesson 3: Project design and tools 
should be tailored to local needs and 
capacities prior to the implementation 
of projects
Identifying the needs of a recipient of donor sup-
port does not necessarily mean that the recipient has 
the capacity to implement the requisite project. The 
needs of a recipient, whether it is a country or an or-
ganisation, and the capacity to utilise resources such 
as donor funds should be the guiding principles in 
determining whether and how a project should be 
funded and implemented. Furthermore, the imple-
mentation tools should be tailored to local capacities, 
including local technological capacities. In brief, both 
capacities and needs should be assessed when de-
signing projects and determining implementation 
strategies.
6 \  Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), http://www.smallarmssur-
vey.org/tools/ro-poa/profiles-of-regional-organizations/the-americas/
mercosur.html (accessed on 3 October 2015).
In 2005, the UN recognised the important role that the marking, 
record keeping and tracing of arms play in strengthening national 
controls by adopting the International Tracing Instrument. This is a 
non-binding instrument that complements the provisions in the bind-
ing UN Firearms Protocol (2001). The general implementation of the 
marking and tracing process has been slow because the computerisation 
of records, which helps to enable a process in which each gun can be 
linked to its last legal user, has been problematic.7 
The SALW marking project implemented by RECSA was launched in 
2010 after the European Union (EU) provided €3 million for a three-
year programme. In 2013, the EU extended the project for a further 
three years, providing an additional investment of €2.7 million. This is 
a trans-regional project managed by RECSA and co-ordinated by the 
African Union (AU). The project focuses on select countries in the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS) and the RECSA region (which cov-
ers the member states of the East African Community—EAC).8 
This programme is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office and 
the European Union. The budget is €6.6 million. In its decision to sup-
port the project, the EU underscored the need for capacity-building in 
Libya as a prerequisite for implementing the project. It declared that
It is necessary to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, Libyan 
ownership in implementing PSSM activities, in line with the 
core principles of national ownership and effective empower-
ment of local partners. Accordingly, the Programme seeks to 
involve relevant Libyan stakeholders, including, as appropri-
ate, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the 
Armed Forces and other relevant actors, in PSSM activities. 
GIZ will provide operational support and technical advice to 
the key partners of the Programme (European Council, 2013, .
The objectives of the programme are to provide support to Libyan state 
institutions to:
   \ exercise control over conventional weapons in-country,
   \ minimise the flow of such weapons,
   \ manage security-related challenges resulting from the war.
7 \  Marking and Tracing, http://www.iansa.org/workarea/marking-and 
-tracing (accessed on 3 October 2015).
8 \  Additional EU Funding for Small Arms Project, http://www.recsasec.
org/index.php/en/what-we-do/european-union-eu (accessed on 
2 October 2015).
Box 5  
Programme of Conventional Arms Control in Libya 
 (2012 to 2017)
Box 4  
RECSA Small Arms Marking Project
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In a similar vein, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has developed 
guidelines to help countries implement various international arms 
control regimes. One such recent guide is a publication on the ratifica-
tion and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). However, no 
clear framework is provided on how the intended beneficiaries of the 
publication could be encouraged to adopt the product. According to the 
author of the report, interpretation of how to use the guidelines seems 
to be dependent upon a country’s own interpretation of what it needs, 
... Since the issues addressed are only of a general nature, coun-
tries need to take their own constitutional and legislative sys-
tem, as well as their political and strategic environments into 
account when considering the changes that need to be made to 
ensure compliance with the ATT (Coetzee, 2014)
The reality however is that although ISS uses the ATT guide in proj-
ects aimed at building the capacity of African states in line with the 
objectives of the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms 
Regulation (UNSCAR), the process is not structured along any specific 
guidelines. It would be equally useful for ISS to package the ATT guide 
into a simplified virtual guide, possibly with audio explanation, or any 
other technologically relevant format that would increase the visibility 
of the tool.
Comment
The essential purpose of marking arms is to 
enable a process of weapons tracing which is both 
effective and timely. This process allows countries to 
properly control the flows of arms not only within 
their territories, but also of arms entering the country. 
The aim of arms marking, according to the United 
Nations, is to enable states to identify and trace, in a 
timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and 
light weapons (SALW) (United Nations, 2006). The in-
tention is that all legal guns should be marked and 
the data on each weapon stored in such a way that fa-
cilitates expeditious retrieval whenever needed. Trac-
ing is the systematic tracking of illicit weapons from 
their source (the manufacturer, or last legal importer, 
or last legal owner) through the lines of supply, to the 
point of diversion to illicit markets. 12 Tracing is a use-
ful element of arms control because once the point of 
diversion is identified, countries can apply preventa-
tive measures to mitigate the weakness.
The approach of using sub-regional implementing 
partners (such as the RECs and UN agencies) as dis-
cussed above in Lesson 1 seems to show promise. 
12 \  Marking and Tracing, http://www.iansa.org/workarea/marking- 
and-tracing (accessed on 12 October 2015).
In 2006, the Small Arms Survey (SAS) developed a set of small arms 
identity (ID) cards to help in the identification and reporting of fire-
arms. The cards were designed to assist researchers, peacekeepers and 
other practitioners working in the field with the visual identification 
of a select number of firearms likely to be encountered during their 
work. The cards were designed to be practical and useful in situations 
of contemporary armed conflict but also in cases of armed crime. It 
was hoped that the ID cards would help field workers to increase the 
accuracy of their SALW reports and that the ensuing identification of 
patterns and similarities would help policymakers to design more tar-
geted interventions. According to SAS, the cards were requested by 
peacekeepers and researchers in Afghanistan and Uganda.9
SAS introduced a similar initiative in 2010 as part of the Regional Ap-
proach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR) initiative10. The cards contained 
images of guns, provided information on calibre and were meant to 
create awareness amongst users. This initiative was undertaken as 
part of a “Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) best 
practices” initiative in general, and was intended to promote better 
understanding of the importance of stockpile management.
Again in 2012, SAS introduced marking, record-keeping, and tracing 
implementation support cards, which were designed to promote the 
easy understanding and use of the International Tracing Instrument 
(ITI). It was a project that was also designed to contribute to the en-
hancement of the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) 
best practices initiative. The project received financial support from 
the United States Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.
However, after producing the cards widely and in various languages 
(including French, Russian, and Spanish), SAS seems to have realised 
that the same could be done better through a virtual system, in line 
with advances in technology. In this regard, SAS seems to be gradually 
moving away from the card system to an electronic database. It notes,
In response to growing demand for small arms identification 
resources, the Survey redesigned its Small Arms ID Cards into 
a comprehensive visual identification system… and features 
downloadable Weapons ID Sheets, which detail the visual 
information required to accurately identify and record par-
ticular types of weapons.11
9 \  Identification and support cards, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/
weapons-and-markets/tools/id-cards.html (accessed on 10 October 
2015).
10 \  Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction, http://www.rasrinitiative.
org/ (accessed on 10 October 2015).
11 \  The Weapons ID Database, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/we-
apons-and-markets/tools/weapons-id-database.html (accessed on 16 
November 2015).
Box 6 
Implementation tools for SALW programmes:  
Examples from SAS and the ISS
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Among RECSA countries, only one (Rwanda) was 
assessed as strong (SAS / GRIP, 2013, p. 24).
The report adds that within Africa, only three 
states have explicitly clear legislative measures con-
cerning small arms marking and have reported suc-
cess in marking state and civilian small arms, i.e.  
Botswana, Egypt and South Africa. Other challenges 
include operating costs, lack of funds, logistical diffi-
culties regarding the transportation of marking ma-
chines, non-operational marking machines and/or 
software, an absence of national action plans, and a 
lack of policies which prioritise the marking of arms 
(ibid. , p. 23).
From the above analysis, RECSA’s initiative to 
support the marking of SALW regionally appears to 
be a step in the right direction in controlling the illicit 
proliferation of SALW. Arms marking and registration 
would indeed ease the burden of tracing. How ever, 
given the challenges faced by countries participating 
in the RECSA project, it appears that the sequencing 
of the marking process may not have been properly 
planned. Perhaps it should have been preceded by not 
only building the capacity of national stakeholders 
but also by ensuring that the necessary conditions for 
implementation were already in place. These condi-
tions include the national level political support, the 
development of relevant legislation, an enabling 
logistical environment (for the transportation of ma-
chines to various parts of the recipient country), and 
the identification of software which is both affordable 
and adaptable to the local context.
The RECSA project serves as a practical lesson 
that illuminates the challenges that regional organi-
sations may encounter at the national level. Such 
challenges become increasingly severe in situations 
where national priorities and commitments are not 
aligned with the objectives of donors or implementing 
partners. Such potential constraints should be identi-
fied at the project design stage, with plans to alleviate 
these constraints put in place prior to the implemen-
tation of projects. 
Contrary to the RECSA example, the EU project to 
strengthen PSSM practices in Libya demonstrates 
more appropriate sequencing. Although this project 
stalled owing to the recent political upheaval in Libya, 
This is especially so as it can foster confidence and 
co-operation at the regional level which may in turn 
lead to better cross-border controls. However, this can 
only be successful where the needs and capacities of 
recipients coalesce. 
RECSA has been implementing a project on the 
marking of arms in its member states. A major lesson 
to be drawn from the RECSA initiative is the need to 
treat each country individually, by identifying capaci-
ties, existing systems and obstacles that might impede 
the marking process before marking machines are 
made available. As noted by Bevan and King (2013) in 
considering lessons learned from this project, most 
countries in the region began marking weapons in 
their capital cities before rolling out the process in 
the countryside. The challenges relating to this roll-
out were not anticipated, and hampered the full im-
plementation of the process. Shortcomings include 
the misallocation of budgets and unanticipated in-
creases in transport logistics. The report identifies 
four phases of the marking process, of which only 
two were successfully catered for, while the other two 
phases faltered. 13
In a review of the successes and challenges en-
countered during RECSA’s arms marking project, the 
Small Arms Survey (SAS) and the Groupe de recherche 
et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) note 
that despite the implementation of the marking 
process,
... Levels of tracing activity…based on PoA national 
reports, shows that 9 countries are strong and 17 
moderate in international cooperation in tracing. 
 
13 \  Phase 1 - requires start-up resources, including expenditure on trai-
ning, marking machines, IT infrastructure, software and the alloca-
tion of fixed assets such as offices and marking spaces in military or 
police facilities. Phase 2 consists of weapons marking in capital cities 
(for example, at police and military facilities or civilian registries). Re-
source requirements are relatively light, because neither marking ma-
chines nor weapons have to be transported over long distances. Phase 
3 involves the deployment of marking teams into the countryside. Dis-
tances increase as the teams move further afield, and resource expen-
diture – on vehicles, fuel, personnel and subsistence allowances. Phase 4 
begins when the state has marked its entire existing weapons stock-
pile and begins to mark weapons it imports by installing marking ma-
chines in the facilities where the weapons are unpacked and cata-
logued – and before they are deployed to military or police personnel. 
See the report, “Making a Mark: Reporting on Firearms Marking in the 
RECSA Region,” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/doc-
s/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR19-Making-a-Mark-RECSA.pdf (accessed on 
15 October 2015).
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a review of the decision of the European Commission 
(EC) shows that that the Commission recognised the 
need to involve relevant Libyan stakeholders such as 
the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, 
the Armed Forces and other relevant actors, in PSSM 
activities. The EU project also took into account the 
importance of working with an implementing partner 
able to identify immediate needs and build capacity 
before implementing a project. Indeed, according to 
the EC decision, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für inter-
nationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) would provide oper-
ational support and technical advice to the key part-
ners of the programme. This is a commendable 
approach as it encourages capacity-building and in-
clusivity in implementation. The local buy-in is highly 
likely to success, hence sustainability of the 
programme.
Finally, and as evidenced by the example of the 
Small Arms Survey’s ID and Best Practice cards men-
tioned above, attempts to develop tools that support 
both research and policy implementation processes 
are important. This is not least because such initia-
tives have the potential to enhance the capacity of 
the recipient while also inculcating a spirit of 
co-operation between donor, implementing partner 
and beneficiary. However, how such tools serve coun-
tries and implementing institutions is difficult to 
measure, especially through a review such as this, as 
there is seldom sufficient information documenting 
the use of such tools.
As mentioned above, to meet their objectives, 
such tools must be tailored to the different needs of 
different local users, be made available in relevant 
languages, and be packaged and disseminated in sim-
plified formats to ensure that they are relevant to, 
and can be accepted by the user community. Depend-
ing on technological capacity, it is likely that “apps” 
will be the next stage in the development of SAS’s 
tools.
Lesson 4: Projects should be protected, 
where possible, from changes in donor 
priorities and internal donor restruc-
turing
Donor countries and institutions, like other 
structures, are vulnerable to internal changes, includ-
ing changes in political priorities, institutional 
re-alignment, etc. Two examples relating to the EU 
are used to illustrate this lesson. The first relates to 
the funding of an ECOWAS SALW project, and the im-
pact a change of policy within the EU had on this 
project. In the second example, the approach adopted 
by the EU presents a positive illustration of how proj-
ects may be protected from internal changes.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 15 
member states, which are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte 
d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
Between 2004 and 2005, SALW funding for ECOWAS was an issue of 
controversy within EU aid policy. The controversy centred on whether 
small arms assistance to ECOWAS should be provided under the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (on the 
basis of the EU treaty) or, as the European Commission argued, within 
the framework of Community Development Cooperation Policy. In 
February 2005, the European Commission asked the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) to nullify the Council decision providing financial and 
technical support to ECOWAS initiatives in fighting SALW prolifera-
tion to ECOWAS (European Council, 2004). These funds were released 
only in 2008 when the ECJ passed a judgment in favour of the European 
Commission. Subsequently, the EU released €597 million to ECOWAS 
for a five-year plan for the period 2008 to 2013. 14
14 \  EU relations with the Economic Community of West African States,    
http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/ecowas/index_en.htm (accessed on 
18 October 2015).
Box 7 
Donor restructuring and ECOWAS
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From the two case studies above (relating to the 
EU funding), it is apparent that the EU plays a dual 
role in global SALW matters—one, as a participant in 
policy and programme formulation and two, as a 
donor. As a participant in international policymaking 
processes, the EU and its member states are involved 
(alongside other UN member states) in negotiating 
new regulatory instruments on SALW, among other 
matters. Through negotiations at the UN level, the EU 
and recipient countries come to collective decisions 
on policy matters (e.g. on the adoption of the ATT and 
the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms). The EU 
is then in a position to help other member states im-
plement these agreements. However, to ensure that 
its focus is maintained and not subject to, for example, 
changes in member state priorities, the EU adopts 
policy instruments such as its Small Arms Strategy. 
Its multi-year funding approach also serves to protect 
recipients from policy or organisational changes. 
This approach, taken since 2005, has been shaped over 
time and appears to offer important benefits to 
recipients.
Lesson 5: The over-funding and dupli-
cation of projects should be addressed 
through increased donor co-ordination 
and national planning
There are cases where donors react to a specific 
situation by funding projects that are either the same 
or closely linked and that are implemented through 
the same local partner. This creates a bloated situation 
in which the capacity of the recipient/s to sustainably 
absorb funding is stretched. The resulting “donor-bloat”15 
risks either the under-utilisation of resources or their 
mismanagement. “Donor bloat” can also result from 
the failure of a donor to build the capacity of the re-
cipient, as explained in Lesson 3 above. When analys-
ing a variety of projects implemented in the countries 
reviewed in this study (see Annex), it appears that 
this phenomenon is more prevalent at the national 
15 \  “Donor bloat” is a term adopted for this Paper to explain the pheno-
menon in which a set of donors, unknowingly or otherwise, fund the 
same project or set of projects in similar or different ways, thereby 
creating parallel projects and duplicating efforts.
One further aspect of the donor–recipient relationship that influences 
the trajectory of funded projects is how donors implement common 
positions and co-operate in relation to recipients of their support. A 
case in point is how the EU has ensured that the “EU Strategy to combat 
illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition” 
keeps pace with changes in the field of SALW, including new regulatory 
instruments, without hurting the expectations of its funding recipients 
(Poitevin, 2013).
The EU Strategy, developed in 2005, seeks to build consensus in relevant 
international negotiations by strengthening policies related to both 
SALW norms and to carrying out bilateral small arms assistance proj-
ects with third countries. For example, the EU took part in the negoti-
ations that led to the adoption of the international Arms Trade Treaty 
(ATT), and events in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel have 
continued to be at the centre of its foreign policy. Given these develop-
ments, the EU constantly reviews its 2005 strategy in order to remain 
relevant to the realities of the day and, more particularly, to maintain 
the relevance of its SALW funding. 
The EU also adopts a multi-year funding approach, which may include 
funding programmes for up to seven years. Projects may initially be 
funded for three years and extended based on mid-term reviews (usually 
undertaken by external parties), during which adjustments to project 
design may also be recommended.
Comment
Although donor restructuring is sometimes una-
voidable due to donors’ internal operations, its impact 
on recipients needs to be managed cautiously so as 
not to cause delays in envisaged projects. However, 
the impact of donor restructuring on the implemen-
tation of projects is difficult to generalise. For example, 
in the ECOWAS example cited above, it is unclear to 
what extent the delay in the release of the funding to 
ECOWAS may have affected the recipient countries, 
and whether any additional costs were associated 
with this situation. Nonetheless, there would likely 
have been higher risks associated with the delay had 
the funds been intended for emergency intervention. 
In contrast, the case of the EU small arms strategy 
shows how the organisation tries to minimise the 
potential negative impact of internal re-alignment 
on projects in recipient countries. 
Box 8 
EU Small Arms Strategy and Multy-Year Funding  
Approach
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Since 2012, Mali has been the target of a range of funding and project 
activities implemented by international organisations. In 2014, Mali 
received €5.56 million from the EU, which was provided, “…recognising 
the urgent need for a comprehensive Demobilization, Disarmament 
and Reintegration across the Mano River and the Sahel Sahara regions 
in order to enhance security…”  (UNDP, 2014). This was preceded, in 
2013, by a project by Handicap International (HI), in which HI sent 
an explosive weapons expert to Mali to identify areas contaminated 
with explosive weapons and to prepare for clearance operations to pro-
tect the local population.18 Between October 2013 and February 2014, 
the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) also supported the UNMAS Mission 
in Mali with the survey and identification of explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) as well as arms destruction. 19
Comment
A general trend that can be observed in the fund-
ing of small arms control initiatives is that because 
donors react in crisis mode in response to a conflict 
situation, they find themselves in higher concentra-
tions during and immediately after a conflict. This 
can sometimes overwhelm the capacity of the recipi-
ent country. It is specifically during such periods that 
the local and national institutions of government 
may be weakened, disorganised, considered illegitimate, 
or even completely absent. This makes the capacity 
to participate in, organise and institutionalise such 
interventions incredibly limited for the states 
involved.
Libya seems to have recognised the importance 
of creating a national structure to co-ordinate the 
work of demining agencies in good time. The existence 
of LMAC and the fact that it operates under the coun-
try’s Ministry of Defence serves to manage the risks 
associated with a bloated donor environment, which 
include the duplication of efforts and non-optimal 
use of resources. This presents a good example of do-
nor–recipient co-ordination. However, as Libya re-
mains in flux, it remains too early to judge the ultimate 
successes of LMAC. 
18 \  See http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/handicap-international-be-
gin-clearing-explosives-mali
19 \  See http://www.maginternational.org/where-mag-works/mali/#.VrH-
iAFLfmlR.
level than at the regional level. This trend also seems 
 to be more common in emergency and/or humani-
tarian situations, where donors may wish to respond 
quickly.
In the aftermath of the Libyan civil war, a range of donors supported 
SALW programmes. Within the same time frame as the EU 
Non-proliferation Consortium, DanChurchAid (DCA) and the Danish 
Refugee Council (DRC) were also implementing SALW programmes, 
while Switzerland was funding the UN Mine Action Service’s (UNMAS) 
work in country. As these efforts continued, the Small Arms Survey 
was also conducting a study on SALW in Libya as was the German 
Federal Office (see Annex). 
Demining is one area where efforts were made to reduce project dupli-
cation through improved co-ordination. The Libyan revolution of 2011 
resulted in the widespread dispersion of landmines across the country. 
The problem of abandoned and unstable ordnance accompanied by the 
proliferation of SALW posed a very high risk to human security. Worse 
still, the civilian uprising that ensued led to the creation of improvised 
weaponry, unsafe storage and abandoned ordnance in areas to which 
the war spread. Abandoned ammunition storage sites allowed weapons 
and ordnance to become easily accessible, and, subsequent illicit SALW 
proliferation posed a danger to civilian populations. 16
A number of demining agencies intervened in Libya. It is reported that 
in April 2011, the UN Mine Action Service partnered with non-govern-
mental organisations including the Danish Demining Group, Dan-
ChurchAid, Handicap International, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Norwegian People’s Aid, MAG (Mines Advisory Group), 
the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action and UNICEF to form a Joint 
Mine Action Committee Team. Noting the range of donor agencies 
focusing on demining and the fact that Libya lacked an institutional 
mechanism to co-ordinate these activities, the Libyan leadership at 
the time—the Rebel Freedom Fighters—created the Libyan Mine 
Action Centre (LMAC), which operates under the Ministry of Defence 
as a body through which the activities of demining agencies could be 
co-ordinated. 
Despite this, the LMAC was still faced with the challenge of co-ordi-
nating the huge influx of funds presented by the many organisations 
intervening in Libya. The impact of all these efforts in terms of the use 
of funds, and the success of demining efforts is not clear. Currently, 
LMAC is continuing to work on the creation of a system to co-ordinate 
all humanitarian mine action organisations in the country. This in-
cludes organising non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to co-ordi-
nate their efforts so that they may work simultaneously without dupli-
cation of effort.17
16 \  See http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/libya
17 \  Country Profile: Libya, http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/16.3/profiles/
ober.shtml (accessed on 20 October 2015).
Box 9  
The case of Libya
Box 10  
The case of Mali
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Africa, do not have a regional co-ordinating body to 
address SALW issues.
Between 2005 and 2010, little evidence can be found of major donor -
funded projects on SALW in the Maghreb region. However, from 2011, 
following the events of the “Arab Spring,” 21 many donors intervened. 
In situations such as this, recipient governments may use the influx of 
aid as an opportunity to cast aspersions on foreign funding, terming it 
“external influence.” In some cases, this has led to the closure of donor 
offices in recipient countries, as was the case in Egypt in late 2011: 
... the then ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) raided the local premises of a number of foreign organ-
isations in Egypt – Freedom House, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung (KAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), the Arab Centre for 
Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACI-
JLP), and the Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory ac-
cusing them of working illegally on Egyptian territory. As a 
result, KAS and Freedom House offices were closed, their work 
suspended, electronic devices confiscated, and many of their 
US and Egyptian employees were eventually tried in Egyptian 
courts (Elagati, 2013).
Perhaps if donors had begun engaging with the government of Egypt 
prior to the crisis, they would have gained greater acceptance, notwith-
standing the changes in leadership. Similarly, could this have reduced 
the risk of weapons proliferating outside the conflict zone into neigh-
bouring countries, as was the case for Libyan weapons entering Mali 
and other surrounding countries?
Comment
This lesson argues for preventative efforts in all 
countries to ensure that SALW initiatives are imple-
mented so that states can honour their international 
obligations and ensure the security of their citizens. 
When conflict occurs, often with the need for emer-
gency interventions to address the more direct risks, 
there are significant limitations to what can be 
achieved in this environment. Therefore, the old ad-
age, “prevention is better than cure”, is more than 
21 \  “Arab Spring” refers to the democratic uprisings that arose indepen-
dently and spread across the Arab world in 2011. The movement origi-
nated in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The protesters challenged 
the existing authoritarian regimes. See:  http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/arab+spring
The National Commission in Mali seems some-
what different. While it has established a set of objec-
tives, it does not seem to actively co-ordinate donors 
or projects towards the achievement of these objec-
tives. The powers of the National Commission are un-
clear in this regard. This is instructive for national 
governments who are recipients of donor funding 
and could serve as a lesson for national focal points 
and national commissions in Africa of the need to 
put in place institutions and systems able to 
co-ordinate funding and project SALW partners. 
Most importantly, national structures should serve 
the purpose of ensuring that donor funding serves 
national priorities and focus on directing funding so 
as to avoiding duplication.
For donors, the need for co-ordination is raised 
consistently in relation to all foreign aid provision 
and is not unique to this issue. In cases of crisis inter-
vention, co-ordination may not be easy to achieve, yet 
should nonetheless be prioritised. Certain steps can 
also be taken to improve co-ordination, including 
joint needs assessments (conducted at the same time 
by different implementing agencies), and ongoing 
communication relating to project activities. This 
could be modelled along the same lines as the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), which brings together different humanitarian 
actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.20
Lesson 6: Risks should be identified 
and managed early rather than focus-
ing on crisis management
In general, there are more emergency interven-
tion projects (those that respond to crisis or conflict) 
than there are preventive or early intervention initia-
tives. For instance, donor support on matters of arms 
control was not significantly visible in countries such 
as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt prior to the “Arab Spring.” 
This indicates that less attention was paid to building 
these countries’ capacities in arms control pre-crisis, 
than to post-crisis situations. One indication of this 
is that the states of the Sahel region, including North 
20 \  Coordination, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination/
overview (accessed on 26 October 2015).
Box 11  
Egypt after the “Arab Spring”
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Comment
Extensive publicity around the launch of a project 
can be productive, in part because it creates public 
awareness of the fact that actions are being taken 
 
 towards achieving greater public security. However, 
this should be complemented by similar public infor-
mation throughout the lifespan of a project, including 
its closure, in order to outline the project’s achieve-
ments. There are great opportunities to build public 
confidence in government agencies and donors if 
project results (both positive and negative) as well as 
lessons learned are profiled. External communication 
should be incorporated into project design and take 
place throughout the lifespan of a project.
It appears that donors and government benefi-
ciaries may be more focused on garnering attention 
at the inception stage of a project, after which both 
gradually become less interested in providing public 
information. It is unclear whether this may also be 
due to donors taking less of an interest in projects 
after their launch, with implementation being left to 
beneficiaries and implementing agencies. While 
allowing this kind of ownership is important, donor 
engagement throughout the lifespan of the project 
remains equally important to ensure that project ob-
jectives are met.
Overall, as discussed in the Methodology section 
above, deficits in the public availability of project 
documentation not only severely limit efforts to 
extract lessons from project interventions, but, as 
illustrated here, may also influence levels of public 
confidence in projects and in how public money is 
spent. Again, while it is likely that reports are produced 
for internal reporting purposes, making these available 
to the public should be an imperative that is taken 
seriously by both donors and beneficiary governments 
in the near future. 
appropriate here. Conversely, notwithstanding the 
risks noted, conflict may also create opportunities for 
external intervention that may not have previously 
existed, creating opportunities for prevention mea-
sures. Such opportunities may arise during the con-
flict as peacekeeping measures may be taken, or in 
the post-conflict environment, where a range of 
peacebuilding measures may be implemented, in-
cluding in the context of peace agreements. For 
example, measures such as incorporating SALW con-
trol best practices may be integrated into security 
sector reform (SSR) processes. 22 
The Egyptian experience was replicated across 
other Arab countries in North Africa that suffered 
similar conflicts such as Tunisia and Libya (see the 
Annex for further information).
Lesson 7: Public information should be 
provided by donors and beneficiary 
governments throughout the lifespan 
of a project
It is common to observe from this online review 
that projects receive more publicity when they are 
being launched than during their implementation 
and closure. Examples of well-publicised launches in-
clude those of the joint UNDP, EU and ECOWAS proj-
ect to boost the fight against the proliferation of 
small arms in West Africa (UNDP, 2014),  and also the 
launch of the Africa–EU Partnership on disarmament23, 
which is the first Pan-African project on SALW to be 
funded by the European Union (SAS & GRIP, 2013). 
Yet, information relating to project progress and clo-
sure of these projects is limited or non-existent. 
22 \  Some of the preventative aspects that could be incorporated in the 
SSR programmes include training security agencies on stockpile secu-
rity, construction of secure storage facilities (armouries), strengt-
hening national legislation, public awareness campaigns and accoun-
tability in government security apparatus.
23 \  The Africa–EU Partnership, http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/
success-stories/co-operating-disarm (accessed on 27 October 2015).
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4\ It is equally important for donors to ensure that 
changes and re-alignments in their internal poli-
cies do not harm the programmes they are fund-
ing in recipient countries. One way of ensuring 
this is for the donor to engage with the recipient 
through all available avenues, especially through 
the UN, where multilateral negotiations on in-
struments related to the implementation of 
SALW processes are negotiated and adopted.
5\ Donor co-ordination is especially important in 
situations of crisis. The research revealed that at 
times several donors operating in the same field 
crowd the scene, only to end up duplicating efforts. 
This leads to an environment bloated with inter-
ventions well beyond the recipient state’s absorp-
tion capacity. Improved donor co-ordination 
would easily eliminate this challenge. 
6\ Donors should identify risks that have the poten-
tial to undermine projects and institute mitigat-
ing procedures before starting to implement such 
projects. It is always advisable to manage a prob-
lem when it is still a risk rather than when it has 
become a crisis. 
7\  As a reflection on the entire study, this lesson 
argues that project documentation should be 
made publicly available from project inception 
to termination. The discussion has noted the posi-
tive outcomes that may be achieved when this 
approach is taken.
This study has presented seven lessons that are 
intended to help donors working on issues of small 
arms control to maximise the impact of the financial 
and technical support they provide to recipient coun-
tries in Africa on SALW initiatives. 
These lessons were drawn from an analysis of 
projects implemented in 16 Sahel countries. It is, 
however, important to note the range of limitations 
relating to this study, as detailed in the Methodology 
section above. As illustrated by the case studies ac-
companying each lesson, there is room for donors to 
improve in a number of ways if their efforts are to 
achieve maximum benefit. 
In summary, the lessons presented in this study 
refer to a range of actions that should be noted of by 
the donors, implementers and beneficiaries of SALW 
intervention projects. These lessons are:
1\ Donors need to note that regional organisations 
can potentially have a positive impact on many 
stakeholders (member states) simultaneously, 
thereby creating cross-border linkages among 
countries. This is necessary for confidence -
building and co-ordination among countries. 
2\ Donors need to recognise and support innovative 
research that covers previously understudied 
areas of SALW control. One such area is an analysis 
of African countries with the capacity to manu-
facture and export arms and ammunition. The 
study by the Africa Europe Faith and Justice 
Network (AEFJN) proves that this kind of research 
can be conducted, particularly through Africa -
based research institutions, or through joint ven-
tures involving both Western and African-based 
institutions. This arrangement seems to increase 
the acceptability of the research by African gov-
ernments, as demonstrated in the case of the 
AEFJN.
3\ It is advisable that donors undertake due diligence 
in determining the immediate needs and capacity-
building requirements of recipient countries before 
rolling out a project. This helps to ensure the proper 
planning and sequencing of activities ahead of a 
project implementation process.
Conclusions
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 Development Co-operation Policy.26 In February 2005, 
the Commission asked the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) to nullify the Council decision providing finan-
cial and technical support to ECOWAS initiatives in 
fighting SALW proliferation to ECOWAS (European 
Council, 2004). It was only in 2008 that the ECJ passed 
a judgment in favour of the Commission with regard 
to matters of development co-operation. The EU even-
tually released €597 million to ECOWAS for a five-year 
plan (2008 to 2013).27
In September 2014, the EC provided ECOWAS with 
a further €2.9 million  in support of the ECOWAS 
Regional Peace, Security and Stability Project. This 
new funding, unlike the 2008 to 2013 project, has a 
wider coverage, but includes SALW initiatives 
(ECOWAS, 2014). 
In yet another case, the EU and West Africa, rep-
resented by ECOWAS and the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (UEMOA) entered into a six-year 
European Union–West Africa Regional Indicative Pro-
gramme (2014 to 2020). Under this arrangement, the 
EU is to avail to West Africa €1 billion (€150 million 
between 2014 and 2020) (European Union, 2015).  
UNSCAR (UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation 
on Arms Regulation)
UNSCAR is a multi-donor flexible funding mech-
anism operated by the United Nations Office for Dis-
armament Affairs (UNODA). Its objective is to fund 
projects aimed at supporting the implementation of 
the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the UN Programme 
of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), in-
cluding South–South co-operation on assistance. 28 
UNSCAR channels the funding through UN 
Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) partners, 
international organisations, NGOs, research insti-
tutes, including universities. Governments wishing 
to apply for funds through the Facility should work 
with eligible organisations to design and submit 
26 \  European Community development. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=uriserv:r12001, accessed 8 December 2015
27 \  EU relations with the Economic Community of West African States, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/ecowas/index_en.htm (accessed on 28 Oc-
tober 2015).
28 \  http://www.un.org/disarmament/UNSCAR/ (accessed on 11 October 
2015).
Apart from the projects reviewed in the main re-
port, this section comprises a listing of other projects 
related to small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
identified through the online review indicated in the 
Methodology section. 
As discussed in the Methodology section, publicly 
available documentation on arms control projects 
can be extremely limited: sometimes there is as little 
as advertisements for consultants to undertake spec-
ific jobs in support of the project.  
The brief descriptions provided below include 
projects at the regional and national level. Regional 
projects refer to those initiatives that have included 
two or more countries in a specific sub-region on the 
continent. 
As will be seen from the projects profiled below, na-
tional projects were not identifiable in all of the 16 
countries reviewed in terms of the methodology uti-
lised. However, all 16 countries under review were 
identified through this review to have been included 
in SALW initiatives, often at the regional rather than 
the national level. 
As has been noted in the Methodology section, 
the projects included below are by no means an ex-
haustive list of the initiatives undertaken in the 
countries under review. 
Projects on the regional level
Economic Community of West African States 
 (ECOWAS) SALW Project
This project targeted ECOWAS member states. 24 
Between 2004 and 2005, SALW funding for ECOWAS 
became an issue of controversy within EU aid man-
agement policy. The question was whether small 
arms assistance initiatives aimed at achieving the 
objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) 25 rather than those of European Community 
 
24 \  ECOWAS Member States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte 
d‘Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Ni-
ger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. http://www.ecowas.int/
member-states/ (accessed on 26 October 2015)
25 \  European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), http://
eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm, accessed 8 December 2015
Annex: Other Identified Programmes and Projects
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Project on Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding
This project was aimed at the League of Arab 
States31 in developing the capacities of its members 
through the establishment of a Crisis Response Centre. 
Of the Arab League’s 22 members, nine are African 
states (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia), and five of 
these are included in this review (Algeria, Libya, 
Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia). 
The project was supported by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and was advertised 
online as a consultancy, with a deadline for application 
in April 2013. The terms of reference are wide, and 
they include an analysis of “…The role played by 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).” 32 There 
seems to be no further information online that indi-
cates progress and outcomes of this project.
League of Arab States–German Federal Foreign 
Office: Workshop on SALW Control and Confidence 
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)
In a speech by German Ambassador and Federal 
Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control at 
a workshop on “Small Arms and Light Weapons con-
trol and Confidence Building Measures” in May 2013 
at the Arab League, Germany renewed its commit-
ment to support Egypt and other Arab States in the 
war against SALW proliferation.33 It is unknown what 
support may have resulted from this commitment.
ECOSAP support
ECOWAS co-ordinates its SALW activities under 
the guidance of the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Pro-
gramme (ECOSAP). In its 2010 annual report, the West 
African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA)  
 
31 \  The League of Arab States consists of 22 members: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauri-
tania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
32 \  Consultancy Services For Conflict Analysis And Peace-Building In 
Egypt,  https://www.devex.com/projects/tenders/institutional-cont-
ract-conflict-analysis-and-peace-building-training/124371 (accessed 
on 27 November 2015). 
33 \  Opening Speech by Ambassador Nikel, Federal Commissioner for Di-
sarmament and Arms Control, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/
Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2013/130513-Nikel.html?nn=424204 (accessed 
on 28 November 2015).
project proposals. During the 2014 Call for Proposals 
(May to July 2014), UNSCAR received 57 proposals  
from qualified applicants. Eighteen (18) projects were 
funded through UNSCAR to be implemented in 
2015/2016.29
Regional Workshop on Arms Export Controls in 
Algeria: 28 to 29 October 2014 
This two-day workshop benefitted officials from 
government customs and licensing departments. 
Participants were from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia. The objective of the workshop was for coun-
tries to discuss national practices and challenges in 
the field of arms control with a focus on the export of 
arms specifically. 30 It is unclear from available infor-
mation whether this workshop was part of a broader 
project.
Outreach Activities in the Field of Arms Export 
Controls: Lessons Learned and Way Forward
This seminar brought together the North African 
countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. 
The initiative was part of the EU activities to promote 
the control of arms exports from EU member states 
to third countries. It took place from 17 to 18 December 
2008 in Rabat, Morocco (BAFA, 2012). It is unclear 
from the available information whether this work-
shop was part of a broader project.
OSCE Mediterranean Conference 2014
This conference took place in Neum, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from 27 to 28 October 2014. The theme 
was “Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons and Fight against Terrorism in the Mediter-
ranean Region” (OSCE, 2014). Algeria, Morocco and 
Egypt were the only countries from Africa that partic-
ipated, due to their proximity to the Mediterranean 
region. It took place under the aegis of the Organisa-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
29 \  UNSCAR 2014 - 2015 Cycle: List of funded projects,  https://s3.amazo-
naws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/UNSCAR-2014-
Funded-Projects.pdf (accessed on 17 October 2015). 
30 \  Regional Workshop on Arms Export Controls in Algeria,  
https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/News/ArtMID/481/Ar-
ticleID/203/Regional-Workshop-on-Arms-Export-Controls-in-Algeria, 
accessed on 24 November 2015
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Projects at the national level
Burkina Faso
RESEARCH ON SALW PROLIFERATION IN BURKINA FASO
In 2009, research was published by the Institut de 
Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Développement 
on the proliferation of SALW (Yameogo, 2009). The 
study made reference to other countries in the region, 
but also presented specific empirical information on 
Burkina Faso. 
REPORT ON STATISTICS OF SALW IN BURKINA FASO
According to a statement by the UN Special Rap-
porteur released in April 2013,36 and confirmed by the 
country’s Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la 
Prolifération des Armes Légères  (CNLPAL), approxi-
mately two million illegal SALW were in circulation 
in Burkina Faso, which has a population of about 17 
million inhabitants.
Cameroon
TRAINING WORKSHOP FOR WOMEN ON VIOLENCE AND SALW
The workshop was organised by the government 
of Cameroon in collaboration with the Secretariat of 
the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS). It took place in Yaoundé in February 2015. 
The objective was to build the capacity of civil society 
with respect to the implementation of the Kinshasa 
Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons—
aimed at curbing the proliferation of SALW in Central 
Africa.37 The workshop was specifically of interest due 
to its focus on women.
36 \  Statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights while countering terrorism. http://www.oh-
chr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13227&Lan-
gID=E#sthash.wadojyxj.dpuf
37 \  Training Workshop in Cameroon: Women, Violence and SALW,  
http://cps-avip.org/capacity-building/2015/training-workshop-came-
roon-women-violence-and-salw (accessed on 27 October 2015).
continued to receive support from ECOSAP for na-
tional co-ordination and community mobilisation by 
the civil society organisations (CSOs) in support of 
SALW projects.
Joint EU-ECOWAS-UNDP project on the fight 
against SALW proliferation
In May 2015, the EU, UNDP and ECOWAS held a 
meeting under the aegis of the Commission Nationale 
pour le Contrôle et la Collecte des Armes Illicites 
(CNCCAI) in Niamey, Niger. The objective was to vali-
date Niger’s national strategy on SALW, as part of the 
greater Mano River Union project that the EU is 
funding with a budget of €5.56 million.34
European Union support to Nigeria.
In November 2015, the EU and ECOWAS announced 
a new initiative known as “ECOWAS–European 
Union Small Arms Project.” The objective is to  
support activities on arms control in a number of 
countries in the ECOWAS region. Through this proj-
ect, the EU seeks to contribute towards “consolidation 
of good governance and regional stability,” and is also 
known as EU–West Africa Regional Indicative 
Programme.35
 Workshop by the Club of Sahel, ECOWAS and OECD
In October 2007, the three parties held a four-day 
workshop in Dakar. The objective was to assess the 
implementation of various regional instruments and 
local mechanisms available for doing so. Groupe Agence 
de Développement, Agence Canadienne de Dévelop-
pement International and Organisation Internationale 
de la francophonie funded the workshop (Agboton 
Johnson, 2007) . 
34 \  La CEDEAO, l’Union Européenne et le PNUD joignent leurs efforts 
pour appuyer la lutte contre les armes légères et de petit calibre au 
Niger,  http://www.ne.undp.org/content/niger/fr/home/presscenter/
articles/2015/alpc.htm (accessed on 29 November 2015).
35 \  ECOWAS-European Union Small Arms Project, http://newtelegrapho-
nline.com/nigeria-to-benefit-from-eu-small-arms-project/ (accessed 
on 26 November 2015).
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EU FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION
In 2012, the European Union provided US $3.2 
million to Chad in the form of international assis-
tance towards mine clearance. Other donors towards 
this effort included Finland and Switzerland.40 
MINE CLEARANCE PROJECT (2014 TO 2016)
In late 2014, MAG initiated a mine clearance project 
in the northern regions of Chad. The project is fund-
ed by the European Commission. The project aims to 
foster safety in Chad by clearing areas of landmines 
and unexploded ordnances as well as through build-
ing Chad’s national capacity to deal with the issue by 
training members of Chad’s National Demining Centre. 41
Côte d’Ivoire
GERMAN FEDERAL FOREIGN OFFICE FUNDING OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT 
WEAPONS
This project runs from 2011 to 2016 and its objec-
tive is to support the national commission (ComNat) 
in implementing actions on SALW.42 Details of the 
budget for the project are not provided online. 
COMNAT ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 2013
This seems to be the only annual activity report 
of the ComNat that is accessible online (ComNat–
ALPC, 2013). It presents the activities covered in 2013, 
the challenges and lessons learned. The report ac-
knowledges the following partners: GIZ, UNDP, the 
Government of Japan, the Government of Australia, 
UN, EU, RECSA and ECOWAS.
SMALL ARMS SURVEY NATIONAL REPORT
This report is dated 2012 and it provides informa-
tion and analysis on the state of SALW proliferation 
in the country. The data collection was undertaken in 
the period 2010/2011 before the political crisis took 
place (de Tessières, 2012). 
40 \ ibid. 
41 \  Chad: http://www.maginternational.org/mag/en/where-mag-works/
chad/#.Vq9F8VLfmk8
42 \  Support for the national commission for the control of small arms 
and light weapons in Côte d’Ivoire, https://www.giz.de/en/worldwi-
de/19304.html (accessed on 29 November 2015).
Central African Republic (CAR)
DDR ET ARMES LÉGÈRES PROGRAMME DE CONTRÔLE ET DE 
RÉDUCTION DES ARMES LÉGÈRES (2006–2009)
This UNDP-led initiative aimed to reduce the cir-
culation of arms among civilians. They implemented 
projects such as “Arms for Development,” in which 
arms were exchanged for development projects. The 
project targeted 50 000 arms that were circulating 
amongst civilians. However, there is no report availa-
ble online that reviews the achievements of this proj-
ect, including the number of arms collected.38
CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PROLIF-
ERATION OF SMALL ARMS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN RE-
PUBLIC (CAR)
GRIP and SAS (2014) conducted this capacity 
assessment study in 2014, which focused on the fight 
against the proliferation of small arms in the CAR. 
The report was for the benefit of the Swiss Foundation 
for Mine Action, and part of a larger project under the 
UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS).  It is unclear how 
the results of the study have been used to benefit the 
country.
REPORT ON CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR) AND SMALL 
ARMS
This report by the Small Arms Survey (SAS) and 
GRIP (2014), is a baseline study on the proliferation of 
SALW in the CAR., published in July 2014. It is addi-
tionally intended to benefit the peacekeeping opera-
tions and security sector reform processes in the country.
Chad
CHAD’S CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS MINE CLEARANCE
Between 2008 and 2012, Chad contributed almost 
US $12 million to its mine action programme.39 This is 
an exemplary show of commitment for a country 
that is still faced with many other human security 
challenges.
38 \  DDR et Armes Légères Programme de Contrôle et de Réduction des 
Armes Légères 2006-2009, http://www.bibliomines.org/fileadmin/tx_bi-
bliodocs/DDR_et_armes_legeres_en_centrafrique.pdf.
39 \  Chad – Support for Mine Action, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2014/chad/support-for-mine-action.aspx
LESSONS FROM SALW CONTROL INITIATIVES IN AFRICA \ NELSON ALUSALA
26 \ \ WORKING PAPER 1  \ 2016
The German Agency for International Co-operation 
is implementing the project.
SMALL ARMS SURVEY STUDY ON THE PHYSICAL SECURITY 
AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT (PSSM) OF SALW
This study provides a brief overview of the PSSM 
practices adopted by Misrata revolutionary brigades 
in Libya, which controlled an estimated 75 to 85 per 
cent of non-state combatants and weapon stockpiles 
following the uprising against Muammar Qaddafi’s 
regime in 2011. The focus of the study was to establish 
how brigades have remained active and prominent 
armed actors well after the end of the 2011 Libyan civil 
war, with the aim of establishing their PSSM proce-
dures several months after the conflict had ceased 
(Small Arms Survey, 2013).
SECURITY, PROTECTION AND STABILIZATION PROGRAMME
This was an initiative of DanChurchAid (DCA) 
and Danish Refugee Council (DRC). In June 2013, the 
EC provided Libya with funding of €5 million. The 
programme focused on securing stockpiles in con-
ventional weapons and ammunition, as well as SALW 
risk reduction (European Union, 2014). The project in-
creased the focus on national capacity-building and 
training for national mine action actors (Wichmann 
& Millard, 2014). 
PROGRAMME ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN LIBYA 
(2012 TO 2017)
This Programme is funded by the German Federal 
Foreign Office and the European Union. The budget is 
€6.6 million. As a way of ensuring Libyan ownership 
in implementing PSSM activities, in line with the 
core principles of national ownership and effective 
empowerment of local partners, the Programme 
seeks to involve relevant Libyan stakeholders, includ-
ing, as appropriate, the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and other rele-
vant actors, in PSSM activities. The German Agency 
for International Cooperation (GIZ) will provide oper-
ational support and technical advice to the key part-
ners of the Programme (European Union, 2013). 
PROJECT ON SALW PROLIFERATION AND COMMUNITY 
SAFETY
This project was initiated in 2012 and was initially 
funded by the Government of Japan at a budget of US 
$4,764,000 in 2012, followed by another amount of US 
$2, 508,147 in the year 2013.43
Guinea
EUROPEAN UNION PROJECT ON SALW
In November 2015, Guinea announced that it had 
received funding from the EU as part of the seven -
country funding for a three-year project (2015 to 2017). 
The objective of the fund is to support community 
and border security by encouraging voluntary disar-
mament. The total fund is €5.5 million.44
PROJECT TO COMBAT ILLEGAL PROLIFERATION OF SALW
This project was recorded as having been 
launched in October (year unknown). It listed three 
objectives: to initiate a community radio project, edu-
cate the public on the dangers of SALW, and to conduct 
voluntary civilian disarmament by exchanging SALW 
for development projects. 45 No further information is 
available online relating to this project. 
Libya
EUROPEAN UNION (EU) INITIATIVE
This is an initiative of the EU Non-Proliferation 
Consortium (Poitevin, 2013) set out in an EU decision 
taken in June 2013 with the aim of assisting the Liby-
an government to strengthen the physical security 
and stockpile management (PSSM) of state-held 
SALW and ammunition. It is a five-year project co -
financed by the EU (€5 million) and the German Federal 
Foreign Office (€1.6 million). 
43 \  Programme d’Appui à la Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légè-
res et de Petit Calibre (ALPC) et à la Sécurisation Communautaire,” 
http://www.ci.undp.org/content/cote_divoire/fr/home/operations/pro-
jects/democratic_governance/project_sample1121.html.(accessed on 30 
November 2015) 
44 \  Armes légères: L’UE appuie la Guinée, http://www.guineeconakry.
info/article/detail/armes-legeres-lue-appuie-la-guinee/ (accessed on 
29 November 2015).
45 \  Gaoual: lancement des activités de lutte contre la circulation des ar-
mes légères http://www.agpguinee.com/fichiers/livre.php?pseu-
do=rub17&langue=fr&code=calb1780&num=5073
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UN MINE ACTION SERVICE (UNMAS) IN MALI
Following the outbreak of armed conflict in Mali 
in 2012, Japan, France, the United Kingdom (through 
UNMAS) and Sweden (through the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency) contributed US $7,681,063 to 
Mali to begin a mine action programme in order to 
train the Malian Defence and Security Forces in ex-
plosive ordnance disposal.49 
In January 2013, UNMAS deployed a rapid re-
sponse capacity to Mali at the request of the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 
order to conduct an emergency assessment of the sit-
uation with regard to explosive threats and in sup-
port of UN Security Council Resolution 2085 (GICHD, 
2015). 
Mauritania
PROJECT ON DESTRUCTION OF SURPLUS SALW IN  
MAURITANIA (2011 TO 2012)
Through this project, HI assisted in the safe de-
struction of ammunition and weapons identified as 
decommissioned or obsolete by the Mauritanian 
army. Fundraising was done through the NATO Part-
nership for Peace Trust Fund for Mauritania, and a 
budget of €2.25 was established. Italy led the Trust 
Fund, with contributions from Luxembourg, Spain, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States as 
well as Germany, which was not part of the Trust 
Fund (Houliat, 2014).
SWEDISH-FUNDED PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY MINE  
ACTION 
From 2006, the following projects were 
implemented: 
   \ Technical Surveys, Demining and Cluster Battle 
Area Clearance Operations in Mauritania. (2011 
to 2014) . The budget was $1,079,653, and imple-
menting partners were the UNDP, Programme 
National de Développement Humaine Durable 
(PNDHD), Corps of Army Engineers and the 
project duration was March 2011 to March 2014.
gramme Begins in Mali http://www.maginternational.org/our-impact/
news/guncutting-programme-opens-in-mali/#.Vq9cz1Lfmk8
49 \  “Mali –Support for Mine Action.” At: http://www.the-monitor.org/
en-gb/reports/2015/mali/support-for-mine-action.aspx. Accessed on 26 
November 2015.
HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL’S SALW RISK AWARENESS 
PROJECT IN LIBYA (2011 TO 2012)
UNMAS46, along with organisations such as the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD),  and Handicap International (HI) 
have conducted risk education programmes aimed at 
the Libyan population in areas affected by the prolif-
eration of SALW (Handicap international, 2012). The 
objectives of these programmes are to raise awareness 
around the dangers posed by SALW, thereby minimis-
ing the risks these posed to civilians in contaminated 
areas.
Mali
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON THE CONTROL OF SALW  
(2014 TO 2018)
With the technical support of UNREC, Mali has 
adopted a five-year national action plan (2014–2018) to 
combat SALW. Financial support for the development 
of this plan was provided by the German government 
(UNREC, n.d.). 
COMMUNITY LIAISON AND RISK EDUCATION
This set of projects has been financially supported 
by Good Gifts, the Swiss government and the UN 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS). MAG implements 
this work, and describes its focus as
reducing the risk of death and injury in communities 
through the delivery of Community-Based Risk 
Reduction strategies, the establishment of a network 
of Community Focal Points (CFPs) and the delivery 
of targeted Risk Education messages amongst IDP, 
returnee and resident populations in northern Mali.47 
ARMS MANAGEMENT AND DESTRUCTION
This is implemented as part of MAG’s regional 
programme in the Sahel–Maghreb. It has been running 
an Arms Management and Destruction Programme 
in Mali since 2013, which is supported by the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US State Depart-
ment’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. 48
46 \  Humanitarian Mine Action, http://www.mineaction.org/program-
mes/libya. (accessed on 19 October 2015).
47 \  See http://www.maginternational.org/where-mag-works/mali/#.Vr-
HeNVLfmlQ
48 \  First Weapons Are Cut As Arms Management and Destruction Pro-
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These activities are part of the Global Programme on 
Firearms and the UNODC Contribution to UN 
Strategy on the Sahel which aims to fight against 
transnational organied crime, including terrorism, 
illicit trafficking firearms and corruption…52
Nigeria
SMALL ARMS SURVEY RESEARCH
In 2007, SAS released a paper titled “Small Arms, 
Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger 
Delta in Perspective.” The objective of the research 
was to raise awareness about issues of insecurity, 
armed violence, and the proliferation of illicit small 
arms in Nigeria since the return to democracy in 
1999 (Hazen, 2007).
Senegal 
TRAINING OF JOURNALISTS ON THE AREA OF SALW CONTROL
In March 2015, ECOWAS, in collaboration with la 
Commission Nationale sur les Armes Légères (ComNat) 
du Sénégal offered training on SALW proliferation to 
a group of about 30 journalists in Dakar. The objective 
of the training was to jointly explore ways in which 
journalists would play a positive role in disseminat-
ing information to the public regarding the negative 
impact of SALW. 53  
UNODC AND COMNAT COLLABORATE TO REVIEW LEGISLA-
TION ON SALW
In September 2014, UNODC held a joint workshop 
with the COMNAT in Dakar in an effort to review 
Senegal’s 1966 law on SALW and to facilitate the de-
struction of arms that are not in state use. The project 
budget stood at four billion CFA. 54
52 \  UNODC and its partners facilitate the process of marking and regist-
ration of small arms and light weapons in Niger, https://www.unodc.
org/westandcentralafrica/en/marking-and-registrati-
on-of-small-arms-in-niger.html. (accessed on 30 November 2015).
53 \  La CEDEAO forme des journalistes sénégalais sur les Armes légères et 
de petit caliber, http://www.panapress.com/La-CEDEAO-forme-des-
journalistes-senegalais-sur-les-Armes-legeres-et-de-petit-calibre--12-
900740-99-lang1-index.html (accessed on 30 November 2015). 
54 \  Contre la circulation des armes légères : Le Sénégal chiffre sa guerre à 
4 milliards,  http://www.lifixew.com/2014/09/contre-circulation-ar-
mes-legeres-senegal-chiffre-guerre-4-milliards/ (accessed on 29 No-
vember 2015).
   \ Victim Assistance in Mauritania” was imple-
mented at a cost of US $510,000. Implementing 
Partners were PNDHD, UNICEF, local non -
governmental organisations (NGOs) and the 
country’s Ministry of Health. The project ran 
from March 2011 to December 2015.
   \ A project on “Mine Risk Education for Nomads 
in Mauritania.” The budget was $295,000 and 
the implementing partners were the Network 
of national NGOs. The project started in March 
2011 but the closing date is incorrectly recorded 
as 2010 (UNMAS, UNDP & UNICEF,  2011). 
PROJECT ON HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT IN MAURITANIA
This project was undertaken by the Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA), with the funding of the government 
of Japan and established in April 2013. With NPA’s 
support, Mauritania declared its compliance with Ar-
ticle 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Sep-
tember 2014, ahead of the clearance deadline of 1 Jan-
uary 2016 for states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. 50
Niger
MAG AND HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL PROJECT ON PHYSI-
CAL SECURITY AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT
In December 2015, HI advertised for the post of 
project head in Niger. The recruit would act as advisor 
and link between the Armed Forces of Niger and 
CNCCAI on matters of stockpile safety.51 The project is 
funded by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abate-
ment as well as by the government of Germany. 
UNDOC AND UNODA FIREARM MARKING PROJECT
In September 2014, the UN United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations 
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) donated 
three marking machines to the government of Niger. 
This was followed by training that also involved 
UNREC. The UNODC stated, 
50 \  Humanitarian Disarmament in Mauritania, http://www.npaid.org/
Our-Work/Countries-we-work-in/Africa/Humanitarian-Disarma-
ment-in-Mauritania (accessed on 27 November 2015).
51 \  Chef der Projet - Niger, https://unjobfinder.org/jobs/146406
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Sudan
SMALL ARMS SURVEY BORDER STUDY (SUDAN–DRC)
This is a baseline assessment report, published in 
2007. It explores the unregulated small arms trade on 
the western part of the border between the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, and 
the influence that armed conflict has had on this 
trade. The research was funded by the governments of 
Canada and the United Kingdom (Marks, .2007).  
Tunisia 
MINE CLEARANCE 
In 2009, Tunisia reported the clearance of nine 
major minefields, in accordance with its obligations 
under the Mine Ban Treaty. Activities were overseen 
by the National Implementation Committee for the 
Mine Ban Treaty while the Tunisian army was re-
sponsible for the actual clearance of the mines. 55
SMALL ARMS SURVEY ASSESSMENT
In 2013, Small Arms Survey (SAS) published a se-
curity assessment report titled, “On the Edge? Traf-
ficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian–Libyan Border.” 
(Kartas, 2013). This report reviewed the proliferation 
of SALW along the Tunisia–Libya border region and 
was funded by the US Department of State’s Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement. SAS runs a broader 
project known as “Security Assessment in North  
Africa”,56 with funding from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, and additional financial 
support from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The 
project also received earlier support from the German 
Federal Foreign Office.  
55 \  Mine Action – contamination and impact, http://archives.the-moni-
tor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/19 (accessed on 26 
October 2015).
56 \  Security Assessment in North Africa, http://www.smallarmssurvey.
org/focus-projects/security-assessment-in-north-africa.html
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